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The law relating to jury trials is diverse in its sources and by no means 
consistent in its content. This article examines aspects of the law relating 
to jury trials and the extent to which the verdict of a jury in a criminal 
trial may be challenged on appeal because of defects in the way the trial 
was conducted or the manner of taking its verdict. The relevant law may 
conveniently be examined in a sequence corresponding to the course of 
the trial: the selection of the jury; the hearing of the case; the jury's 
consideration of the issue of guilt or innocence, and the rendering of its 
verdict. 
I THE SFI FCTION OF T H E  J U R Y  
The law in relation to the composition of the jury is now found in two 
recent statutes: the Juries Act 1981 and the Crimes Act 1961, as amended 
by the Crimes Amendment Act (No. 2) 1980. In addition to these statutes 
there is an apparent, though ill-defined, inherent power in the courts to 
regulate matters not clearly laid out in the statutes. 
The Juries Act 198 1 considerably simplified the law relating to jury trials. 
In essence it provides that all registered electors between the ages or 20 
and 65 are qualified to, and may be called upon to, serve on a jury.' 
Individuals may be disqualified by reason of a prior criminal record in 
some cases2 and certain classes of people may not sit on a jury at all.' 
These forbidden classes are principally those connected with the 
administration or operation of the justice system, but includes also persons 
incapacitated by physical infirmities, such as deafness or blindness, or 
suffering from mental disorders.4 Jurors can be challenged for lack of the 
basic qualifications under s.6 or for disqualification under s.7 or being 
barred by s.8 or they may be challenged as not being impartial as between 
the defence and the prosecution.5 It is provided by s.25(2) of the Act that 
these are to be the sole grounds of challenge for cause of any juror. Any 
challenge for cause is to be determined by the judge in chambers "in such 
manner and on such evidence as he thinks fit".6 
These provisions leave unanswered two potentially important questions. 
The first is whether there are any procedural requirements as to  the way 
in which the trial judge decides any challenge for cause. Discussion of 
this can conveniently be postponed to consideration of the ambit of s.376 
of the Crimes Act 1961. 
The second question is the degree to which the provisions of s.25(3) 
distort the recognised law relating to the selection of the jury. It is clear 
that the classes of persons excluded by the Act do  not cover all the disabilities 
I Juries Act 1981, s.6. 
2 Juries Act 1981, s.7. 
Juries Act 198 1, s.8. 
Juries Act 1981, s.8(i) and 6). 
5 Juries Act, s.23 and s.25. 
Juries Act, s.25(3). 
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which the common law recognised as rendering a juror unsatisfactory. 
Intoxication of a juror at the time of empanelling would appear to have 
been a ground of incapacity which should have disentitled the juror to  
sit.' More importantly, inability to  understand the language in which the 
trial was conducted has been held to render the juror disqualified from 
serving.Vlthough such grounds for objection might be held at common 
law to have been waived if counsel knew of them at the time of the 
empanelling of the jury and failed to object,9 it appears that under the 
New Zealand Act counsel could not challenge the juror for cause. 
At common law simple misnomer of a juror would not prevent the juror 
from sitting, but the deliberate impersonation of a juror by another person 
not qualified to sit rendered the trial a nullity.10 If a person qualified to 
sit on a jury but not summoned for this sitting of the court appears and 
impersonates a person duly summoned, it appears he also cannot be 
challenged for cause. 
It is also important to note that s.33 of the Juries Act 1981 provides 
that the verdict of a jury is not to be "in any way affected merely because" 
of the presence on the jury of a person not qualified to  sit or disqualified 
from sitting by s.7 or s.8. The logical implication of this is that the presence 
of a juror who ought not to  have sat alone is no ground for challenge 
to the verdict; but if there is an added element (e.g. incomprehension of 
the language) which renders the verdict unsafe or unsatisfactory, the verdict 
is challengeable. The essence of the challenge is therefore not the lack of 
formal qualification by the juror but the risk of an unsafe verdict. It is 
perhaps not surprising to  the student of New Zealand legislation that s.33 
thus appears to contemplate the validity of a challenge to a verdict because 
a juror was incapable of performing his function properly but does not 
allow that juror to be challenged for cause on the same grounds. It is, 
however, a result which might strike the logician as unusual. 
These lacunae in the Juries Act are the more surprising since in the 
1980 amendment to the Crimes Act certain other grounds for challenge 
recognised in the cases, notably the illness or impending death of a relative 
of the juror, became a ground for the discharge of the juror.I1 It would 
appear that counsel who is aware at the time of empanelling a juror of 
disabling characteristics such as impersonation, intoxication or incompre- 
hension cannot rely on a challenge for cause but must rely either on a 
peremptory challenge or seek the assistance of the trial judge. The power 
of the judge to assist must derive either from s.374 of the Crimes Act 
or from an inherent power in the court. The statutory provision gives the 
judge the power to discharge the jury without giving a verdict if it has 
deliberated for four hours without giving a verdict12 or, more generally, 
if 'in any emergency or casualty' it is 'highly expedient' to do ~ 0 . ~ 3  Individual 
' Ex parte Morris (1907) 72 J P  5. 
Ras Behari La1 v King Emperor [I9331 All ER Rep. 723. 
See Ras Behari La1 v King Emperor [1933] All ER Rep. 723 at 726. 
l o  R v Wakefield [I9181 1 K B  216. 
Crimes Act 1961, s.374(3) as substituted by Crimes Amendment Act No. 2, 1980, s.13 
- cp. ManseN v Reginam (1857) 8 E & B 54. 
I Z  Crimes Act 1961, s.374(2). 
l 3  Crimes Act 1961, s.374(1). 
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jurors can be discharged 'at any time before the verdict of the jury is taken' 
on the compassionate grounds noted above or if the Court becomes aware 
that a juror is disqualified or the juror 'becomes incapable of continuing 
to perform his or her duty'.l4 The exercise of the judge's discretion to 
discharge is stated to be not reviewable in any court.I5 
It may be noted that this last provision appears to have been based 
on the common law rules, but it is to be doubted if it can be read without 
qualification. If there were a refusal to discharge the jury which resulted 
in a clear miscarriage of justice it is hard to believe that the Court of 
Appeal would not allow an appeal against conviction. It seems that the 
cases of impersonation of a juror or incomprehension by a juror of the 
language used at the trial render the trial a nullity within the meaning 
of s.385(l)(d) of the Crimes Act, since this would have given grounds for 
a venire de novo at common law.16 However if the discretion to discharge 
is exercised it is unreviewable.lba 
The section does not seem apt to cover cases of original incapacity such 
as ignorance of English - a juror incapable of performing his duty at 
the outset does not 'become' incapable - but on a broad approach to 
statutory interpretation such cases could be covered by that provision. It 
is submitted however, that the word 'disqualified' in s.374(3) ought not 
to be restricted to the meaning given by s.7 of the Juries Act 1981, and 
that all cases of disqualification at common law are to be comprehended 
by the current provision.17 It is suggested that such an interpretation would 
give the trial judge a similar power in regard to a juror as that contained 
in regard to the whole jury by s.374(1). It has long been recognised that 
that power should be used only where there is a substantial risk of prejudice 
to a fair trial between the parties.18 Those grounds of disqualification not 
included in the Juries Act are all predicated on the risk of the trial being 
unfair. It would be desirable to have a high degree of compatibility between 
the applications of the two provisions. 
The inherent jurisdiction of the court in controlling the composition of 
the jury is of uncertain scope. It is clear from the case law that it existsI9, 
but the cases have not clearly laid down its limits. In Greening the Court 
of Appeal considered that, at the least, the judge has a power to exclude 
from the panel from which the jury is drawn any person who may not 
be indifferent as between the parties and it was of the opinion that the 
power was sufficient to exclude a juror who had been ballotted and whose 
presence on the jury was not challenged by counsel. The existence of the 
inherent power to intervene in the interests of a fair trial is not doubted 
in Bell and Re Kestle No. 2, but both cases are concerned with instances 
l 4  Crimes Act 1961, s.374(3). 
Crimes Act 1961, s.374(8). 
l6 See the discussion of s.385(l)(d) in Re Kestle [I9801 2 NZLR 337, at 348 and Re Kestle 
(No.2) [I9801 2 NZLR 353, 358. 
16" Felise (unreported C.A. 268183, decn 5.10.84). 
l 7  This 'disqualification' may also cover possible lack of impartiality thus covering the point 
raised by the Court of Appeal in Re Kesrle (No.2) 1oc.cit. at 357. 
See Binley & Walsh (1912) 31 NZLR 949, 15 GLR 42 and cf. Adriaanse [I9771 2 NZLR 
337. 
l 9  See Re Kestle (No.2) [I9801 2 NZLR 353, Bell [I9581 NZLR 449 and Greening [I9571 
NZLR 906. 
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where the inherent jurisdiction was excluded by the statute because the 
jury had actually been empanelled before jurors were excluded. It seems 
that in both the latter cases the court was of the opinion that once the 
jury had been empanelled, the only recourse of the judge is to his statutory 
powers and the inherent power is no longer operative. While this is probably 
the correct approach, it is clear that the limits of judicial control over 
jury selection are not yet clearly defined. It is suggested that the power 
to exclude jurors is not limited to partiality, or the possibility of it, but 
extends to  other forms of incapacity or disqualification (as would appear 
to be the view of the Court in Greening from their reliance on Mansell 
v The Queen20). However, it must be doubted whether in practice the power 
will be of use except where the defect is readily apparent. It seems accepted 
that a judge can invite jurors to disqualify themselves for possible bias, 
either because of knowledge of the circumstances or persons involved in 
the trial or possibly on wider ground$', but it is to be doubted whether 
he would be entitled to raise any other grounds of incapacity to serve. 
It is also difficult to determine whether counsel can seek to have the judge 
intervene and use his inherent powers without contravening s.25 of the 
Juries Act 198 1 - insofar as, in effect, they would be challenging for cause 
on grounds not given in the Act. A breach of s.25 in these circumstances 
might, however, be regarded by the Court of Appeal as being an irregularity 
which can be dismissed as not causing any miscarriage of justice. Certainly 
the approach taken in Re Kestle (No.2Y2 would appear to excuse an 
intervention by the judge to provide a fair trial even if it is technically 
outside his Dowers. 
The above discussion has omitted reference to the judge's power to stand 
aside jurors. The relevant provision, s.27 of the Juries Act 1981, allows 
the judge to stand aside any juror either on his own motion "in the interests 
of justice" or on application by either party consented to by the other 
party, or one of the other parties. This provision would deal with such 
difficulties as the juror who is intoxicated at the time of the empanelling 
of the jury, and would logically exclude a person who appears to the judge 
not to have sufficient command of English to comprehend the proceedings. 
However, it is not always a sufficient safeguard in that a juror who has 
been stood aside may nevertheless be required to serve if otherwise a full 
jury cannot be empanelled. If that should be the case eligibility to serve 
will become a live issue. 
The foregoing has largely related to grounds for challenge which are 
not, or may not be, covered by the existing law. Before departing from 
this area, it is desirable to consider a special case of the ground for challenging 
for cause - that of knowledge of any prior criminal record of the accused. 
It appears clear that if the jury as a whole is made aware of prior 
convictions of the accused by the admission of inadmissible evidence of 
it, the verdict may be challenged23 Further, if the jury is made aware of 
contemporaneous proceedings against the accused which have resulted in 
20 (1857) 8 E & B 54, 120 ER 20. 
2 1  E.g. the request by the trialjudge in Dr. Arthur's case that no-one connected with handicapped 
children should serve - see the reference in A-G v English [I9821 2 All ER 903,906. 
22 10c.cit. 
23 See the cases cited in Adams, Criminal Law and Practice in New Zealand, 2nd ed., p. 
973ff. 
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conviction, or even in disagreement with a majority in favour of conviction 
the verdict should be quashed.24 This is predicated on the risk of prejudice 
to the accused - the same ground as was relied on to exclude jurors who 
have sat in related trials in Greening. 
Yet, it appears that where a single juror is made aware of, or has prior 
knowledge of, prior criminal behaviour by the accused, there is not 
necessarily a fatal flaw in the proceedings. 
There appears to be no authority on this point in New Zealand, and 
the English and Australian cases are not entirely consistent. In England, 
it appears that a juror with prior knowledge of convictions ought not to 
serve on the jury25; and if such a person does sit and the fact becomes 
known the usual and proper course is to discharge the jury as a whole.26 
The presence of a juror with such knowledge does not, however, make 
the trial invalid and it is possible in proper cases to affirm the conviction 
if no serious miscarriage of justice has occurred.2' 
The Australian approach, as shown in the recent decision of Booth28 
is less stringent. The Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal held that the 
key question was whether the juror had predetermined the issue, and the 
juror's knowledge of the accused's prior criminal history did not indicate 
such predetermination. On that basis a juror with such knowledge may, 
it seems, sit provided the knowledge does not make him refuse to consider 
the evidence led at the trial. 
The New Zealand courts are free to choose between these approaches. 
It is suggested that, insofar as jurors may now serve despite prior criminal 
records of their own, the risk of a juror with knowledge of the accused's 
antecedents is increased and, it would thus be inconvenient to adopt the 
English view. If the juror prefers not to serve, there is no doubt that he 
could be discharged under the inherent power, but his continuance on the 
jury would not, of itself, vitiate the verdict. 
There is connected with this issue a problem of resolving the procedure 
for determining whether the presence of a juror may have vitiated the trial. 
In Hood the Court of Appeal received evidence by affidavit from the juror 
as to his knowledge and whether he had communicated it to any other 
juror. This was seen as not infringing the rule against receiving evidence 
as to what took place between the jurors in their consideration of the issues 
during the trial. In Box the Court of Appeal even went so far as to call 
the juror before them and examine him as to his conduct. This latter cause 
of conduct was strongly attacked by Lush J. in Booth. In that case the 
court received an affidavit from the person who was the source of the 
juror's information about the accused, but not one from the juror herself. 
Lush J. took the view that to receive affidavits from the juror might be 
permissible but to examine a juror could only be justifiable in extreme 
cases. 
Before further considering this procedural problem, regard should also 
24 See R v Parry [I9481 NZLR 191. Quaere whether such a defect is now absolutely fatal 
- in the light of Re Kestle (No.2). 
25  BOX [I9641 1 QB 430; [I9631 3 All ER 240. 
26 Hood [I9681 2 All ER 56. 
27 AS was in fact done in both Hood and Box. 
28 119821 8 A.Crim R. 4, Victorian C.C.A. 
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be had to two other possible challenges to the continuance of the jury 
which present similar procedural issues. These are contacts between jurors 
and the public or persons connected with the trial and cases where attempts 
are made to influence or affect the verdict of the jury or members of it. 
Contact between the jurors and persons connected with the trial is seen 
clearly as an irregularity but not one which necessarily vitiates the trial. 
The English courts in a series of cases have shown that provided nothing 
of substance concerning the trial passed between the jurors and others in 
some way connected with the trial the verdict is unaffected. It appears 
that the jurors may be examined by the trial judge to determine whether 
any matter of substance did pass between the parties.19 The New Zealand 
Court of Appeal has taken a similar approach to the problem of contact 
with a juror in Riley30 although in that case no evidence from the juror 
was offered or sought as the Court was satisfied from the affidavits of 
the witnesses who had discussed the case briefly with a juror that nothing 
of significance had been shown to have passed between them. 
Different considerations obviously apply where the juror goes out of 
his way to make contact with the accused31 or the jury has been s e q u e ~ t e r e d ~ ~  
or have retired to consider their verdict. In such cases it appears that contact 
with members of the public or particularly with persons connected with 
the trial would be held to be so material as to justify the discharge of 
the jury or the vacating of their verdict. 
The issue of pressure on the jury arises really in two ways. The first 
is one of undue publicity which may be prejudicial to the accused. It has 
been the view of the courts in recent years that where this occurs in the 
general run of cases, publicity given to the trial or the accused can be 
countered sufficiently by a warning by the trial judge.33 More difficulty 
is encountered with direct pressure on jurors to come to a particular verdict 
or to be affected in how they come to their decision. There again appears 
to be no direct authority in New Zealand, though the point has arisen 
in Australia and Canada. In the United Kingdom majority verdicts appear 
to have reduced the potential difficulties. 
There are a number of reported Australian cases34 where the issue of 
pressure on the jury has arisen. The modes of dealing with the issue have 
been diverse,35 but the general principle of the cases is that the occurrence 
of an effort to pressure the jury is not of itself, any ground for terminating 
the trial - rather the reverse. "The administration of justice would come 
to a standstill if this court were to hold that a criminal trial could be 
aborted by the simple device of an anonymous telephone call to a member 
29 See Prime (1973) 57 Cr.App.R. 632 and Sawyer (1980) 71 Cr.App.R. 283. 
30 [I9821 1 NZLR  1 .  
Binley & Walsh (1912) 31 NZLR 949, 15 G L R  42. 
32 Wilson [I9541 NZLR 4. 
3 3  Zampaglione [I9821 6 A.Crim.R. 287 is a recent example. 
34 Boland [I9741 V R  849; Zampaglione, supra; Waring [I9721 QWN 20; Thompson & Kossaris 
[I9821 7 A.Crim.R. 468; E.J. Smith [I9821 2 N S W L R  608, 7 A.Crim.R.253; Sfrefton & 
Storey [1982] V R  251. 
35 Jurors may be asked if they wish and are able to continue (Waring, supra) or the jury 
may be generally warned to put aside any extraneous communications (Thomson & Kossaris, 
supra) or a juror may be separately questioned and warned by the judge (Boland, supra). 
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of thejuryW.36 However, there is one authority holding that if a juror does 
feel threatened the jury should be discharged, since the juror would be 
incapable of bringing a 'calm and dispassionate judgment'.37 This appears 
to have been the only case where there was evidence of a juror feeling 
intimidated, but insofar as the case indicates that a juror who is prepared 
to carry on in the face of threats whose force he has felt should not be 
permitted to continue, it is certainly out of line with other decisions of 
the same or equivalent Australian courts.38 It is submitted that it should 
not be followed in New Zealand. 
The Canadian authorities are scantier39 but regard,in essence, the approach 
of the older Australian cases as correct in holding that threats to a juror 
cannot of themselves abort the trial. Where the Canadian authorities differ 
greatly is in determining the procedure to be used in deciding whether 
to discharge the jury or a juror. The critical difference is in regard to the 
right of the accused to be present, and where there have been threats or 
pressure on a juror, the accused must be given the opportunity to be involved 
in the decision as to whether the jurors can carry on. To determine the 
issue in his absence is a flaw vitiating the trial,40 and one which cannot 
be cured by applying the proviso. Whether the same result would occur 
in New Zealand depends on the interpretation given to s.376 of the Crimes 
Act 1961. That section is of great relevance to a number of other issues 
canvassed above and it is to that section we should now turn. 
I1 THE ACCUSED'S RIGHT O BE PRESENT A  THE TRIAL 
Section 376 of the Crimes Act provides that "(1) Every accused person 
shall be entitled to be present in court during the whole of his trial, unless 
he misconducts himself by so interrupting the proceedings as to render 
their continuance in his presence impracticable. (2) The court may permit 
the accused to be out of court during the whole or any part of any trial 
on such terms as it thinks proper". 
This provision is not directly comparable with the Canadian legislation 
which provides that the "accused . . . shall be present in court during the 
whole of his trial" except where he has misconducted himself so as to 
make continuance of the proceedings impractical or the accused has sought 
permission to be absent or in certain cases, during consideration of his 
fitness to plead.4' This section is more clearly mandatory than the New 
Zealand section. It is suggested by Caldwell that the effect of s.376 is to 
re-enact the common law rule that required the presence of the accused 
in court at all stages of the trial and that despite the permissive nature 
of the wording of s.376 the effect is a mandatory one.42 It may be that 
the effect of the section is not quite as clear as this view would indicate, 
36 Zampaglione, [I9821 6 A.Crim.R. 287 at 294. 
3' Stretton & Storey, supra, at 255. 
Zampaglione, E.J. Smith, Thompson & Kossoris and Waring all appear to be contrary 
to the Stretton view. 
39 Hertrich, Skinner & Stewart (1982) 67 CCC (2d) 520; Frisco (1970) 14 CRNS 194. 
40 Hertrich. Skinner & Stewart, supra. 
4'  Criminal Code Act, s.577(1) and (2). 
42 Garrow and Caldwell's Criminal Law in New Zealand, 6th ed., p. 361. 
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and that, in any case, the common law rule is not as clear as Caldwell 
would indicate. 
The common law rule would appear to have regarded the presence of 
the accused at the trial as a privilege which could be waived expressly 
or by conduct. Thus a prisoner who escaped from custody during his trial 
could be regarded as having waived his right to be present and the trial 
could continue in his absence.43 The discretion to allow the case to continue 
is however not absolute, but where the bulk of the Crown's case is completed 
before the accused's voluntary abandonment of the proceedings and/or 
a co-accused wishes the trial to  continue, continuance is justified.44 It may 
well be that continuance of the trial in the absence of the accused is 
permissible in circumstances other than voluntary abandonment by the 
accused of his right to presence. In Howson4S the Court of Appeal indicated 
that if sickness caused the absence of the accused during a major part 
of the trial or during the giving of critical evidence, the trial of that accused 
must be aborted and a fresh trial held at a later stage. However the court 
indicated that pragmatic considerations must limit the scope of this principle 
and if no serious prejudice is done to the accused by his absence it may 
be at least condoned. 
It does, however, seem that in practice the common law rule related 
only to the presence of the accused during the parts of the trial concerned 
with the hearing of evidence, the summing up to the jury (including any 
supplementary instructions) and the taking of the verdict and sentencing. 
It does not appear to apply to  the investigation of collateral issues such 
as possible disqualification or discharge of a juror. Thus a judge may validly 
discharge a juror on compassionate grounds without informing either 
prosecution or defence46 or may question a juror who has given information 
to the judge of threats issued to him without informing counsel - at least 
if the issue of threats to the jury has been earlier canvassed in open court4' 
These decisions do not represent the normal procedures of the courts, but 
they appear to be within permissible limits. The apparent basis is that 
questions as to  the fitness of a juror or the jury do not contribute to the 
resolution of the principal issue in contention between prosecution and 
defence.48 This reasoning is at best doubtful. 
The Canadian cases take a dramatically opposed position. It is clear 
that s.577 of the Criminal Code is taken to require the presence of the 
accused of any steps relevant to the procedures for determining guilt or 
innocence. These will include the empanelling of the jury and enquiries 
as to the possible discharge of any juror49 and this requirement of the 
accused's presence is not observed by presence of counsel for the accused 
- he must be personally present.50 Failure to  observe the statutory 
43 Jones (No.2) (1972) 56 Cr. App. R. 413, [I9721 1 WLR 887; McHardie & Danielson [I9831 
2 NSWLR 733. 
44 McHardie & Danielson, supra. 
45 (1981) 74 Cr. App. R. 172. 
46 Richardson [I9791 3 All E R  247. 
47 E.J. Smith, supra. 
48 Ibid. at 6 13. 
49 See Hertrich, Skinner & Stewart, supra and the cases discussed therein, esp. at 528-529. 
Dunbar & Logan (1982) 138 DLR (3d) 221, Ontario CA. 
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requirement goes to the jurisdiction of the court and cannot be cured by 
reference to the proviso on appeal - though there is no nullity grounds 
in the Canadian equivalent of s.385 of the Crimes Act. 
What then is or should be the New Zealand position? The general trend 
of the New Zealand decisions is to follow English procedures5' and thus 
it would appear that the courts might be prepared to deal with ancillary 
matters in the absence of the accused. The courts in this country have 
insisted that all important communications with the jury take place in open 
court in the presence of the accused52 though it seems that purely procedural 
issues such as enquiries as to whether a verdict will be likely to be reached 
before the time for a meal may be made without reference to counsel or 
the accused.53 It is submitted that the requirement of openness that is 
recognised to apply to all important communications with the jury as a 
whole in England, New Zealand and A ~ s t r a l i a ~ ~  ought to extend to questions 
of discharge of individual jurors or the discharge of the jury as a whole. 
As is indicated above, this would appear to conflict with English and 
Australian procedures, but it is hard to see that the discharge of a juror 
other than in open court can be other than a breach of the general rule 
requiring matters to be dealt with in open court. It is submitted that the 
application of s.376 of the Crimes Act makes the argument in this sense 
stronger. Any questions involving the continuance on the jury of a person 
who might be likely to be affected in his consideration of the case by such 
matters as prior knowledge of the accused or threats or pressure applied 
to the juror or jury involves the question of whether a fair trial can be 
had if the juror continues to sit. In essence, this is for the accused part 
of the question of whether he is being properly tried, and he has the right 
to be present.55 
It may be noted that s.376 only refers to the presence of the accused 
"in court".56 This might allow an argument that proceedings in chambers 
need not be in his presence and that therefore no infringement of the section 
occurs where discharge of the jury or a juror is considered in chambers. 
it is submitted that such a distinction would be specious - much might 
then turn on whether the judge retired to his chambers to discuss the matter 
or whether he discussed it in the courtroom with the jury excluded. It 
is suggested that the statutory principle ought to apply to the resolution 
of all issues which impinge on the determination of guilt or innocence 
whether or not they take place in chambers or the courtr0om.5~ 
There are, however, other difficult questions arising as to the ambit of 
s.376. The first is whether it has any application to questions arising on 
the empanelling of the jury. The judge there has the power to determine 
challenges for cause in such manner as he thinks fit. Need this be done 
5' See, e.g. George (unreported CA 249183, judgment 21.2.84, at p. 13). 
52 Zamparutti [I9731 2 N Z L R  151. 
53 George, supra. 54. See e.g. Townsend [I9821 1 All ER 509; Firzgerald (1889) 15 VLR 40; 
Zamparutri supra. 
55  See the argument of Martin JA in Hertrich. Skinner & Stewart, supra, at 539. 
56 It is clear that the principle of the accused's presence extends to views which take place 
outside the courtroom. It is therefore logical that the right to presence extends to chambers 
proceedings outside the courtroom. 
57 Dunbar & Logan, supra. 
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in the presence of the accused? There is no clear authority. It is submitted 
that the Canadian view that any matter connected with the empanelling 
of the jury requires the presence of the accused is a desirable one. The 
expectation of any accused must be that he sees for himself the selection 
of the persons who are to decide his guilt or innocence, and he would 
have a genuine cause to consider proceedings unfair if he was not a party 
to the procedures whereby the jury were selected. The discretions given 
by the Juries Act ought to be governed by this element of procedural fairness, 
and indeed it is a discretion which, when exercised in the District Court, 
might be reviewable in the High Court on administrative law principles. 
The principle adopted should be consistent for all jury trials so it is submitted 
that if in the District Court a right to presence is established, the same 
rule should be adopted in the High Court, notwithstanding the general 
rule that a High Court Judge's exercise of a discretion is not reviewable. 
It is possible to raise the countervailing argument that s.25 of the Juries 
Act lays down that the decision of a challenge for cause shall take place 
in chambers; and the accused would not normally be present in a discussion 
in chambers. It appears that in Canada the accused must be present on 
discussions in chambers where these relate to significant issues during the 
trial. It is submitted that to distinguish between chambers and court here 
would be as illogical as it would be in cases arising during the trial; the 
arguments as to that have already been canvassed. 
Before leaving this point, it must be noted that the right to presence 
is not the same as the right to present argument. It is clear that even if 
the accused is informed, as he should be, of communications from the 
jury, there is no obligation on the judge to seek submissions from either 
Crown or defence as to the course to be followed.58 It is, however, unlikely 
that refusal to allow the defence to make submissions on certain matters, 
(as, for instance, whether a juror should be disqualified for lack of 
impartiality) could be treated by the courts as other than an irregularity. 
It might be curable by reference to the proviso to s.385, but it is difficult 
to see how a jury verdict reached by a jury which included a juror whose 
impartiality or ability is doubtful could be upheld except in the clearest 
of cases. 
I11 THE JIJRY'S DELIBERATIONS 
Once the jury has retired to consider its verdict, the rules regarding contact 
with the jury become both more stringent and less uncertain. Contact 
between other persons and the jury should be as limited as possible, and 
such court staff as have contact with the jury must act as no more than 
mere conduits for the passage of information from the Judge to the jury.59 
The involvement of non-jurors to any further extent may in effect vitiate 
the whole proceedings, despite the provisions of s.370(3). As Adams 
indicates,60 it is difficult to see how an irregularity justifying discharge of 
the jury prior to announcing its verdict if it had been discovered at that 
point can cease to be a vitiating element if discovery does not occur before 
the verdict is taken. 
58 Zaniparurri, supra, is a good example of statements of this principle. 
59 George, supra, is the latest restatement of this old rule. 
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There is clearly power in the court to control all information received 
by the jury during their deliberations, and only in exceptional cases can 
the jury be left with the possibility of acquiring further information without 
direct control by the court.61 If the jury require further information this 
must be requested of the trial judge and the answer, be it refusal to supply 
the information or not, must be given in open court and in such a way 
that the accused knows what requests the jury have made.62 
There are two specific matters which do raise more limited questions 
which may be of concern in a number of cases. The first is where the 
jury indicates that it is having difficulty in reaching a verdict; the second, 
and at times interlocking, case is where deliberations of the jury have 
extended for a considerable period of time. 
A difficulty in arriving at a verdict may occasionally be because of a 
misunderstanding of the issues before the jury63 and any communication 
showing such a misunderstanding may necessitate a re-charge as to the 
critical elements. If, as is more common, the jury have understood their 
task but find difficulty in reaching agreement, the judge may instruct them 
as to the desirability of attempting to find a unanimous verdict. Where 
there is such a difficulty, the jury may be given directions as to  
reconsideration of their positions,64 but the charge must not weaken the 
requirement of genuine agreement on the verdict by all of the jurors.65 
The judge is not bound to accept a statement by the jury as to their position, 
but if he sends them back for further deliberation and a radically different 
verdict is given, this may be challengeable.66 
If the jury indicate an inability to reach an unanimous verdict, they may 
be discharged without reconsideration. The judge must be careful to ensure 
that a position of deadlock exists and may not phrase his questions as 
to lack of agreement so as to encourage the jury to report inability to 
agree where there is a real possibility of agreement given further time for 
deliberations.67 
Linked to this issue often is the length of the jury's deliberations the 
judge may discharge after 4 hours, if he thinks fit,68 but this is clearly 
only a lower limit. The mere length of deliberations is not, in itself, a 
ground for ~hallenge.6~ However, if the jury have not expressly been informed 
of their right to disagree and there is some element in the proceedings 
which may have indicated to the jury that they would be kept in deliberation 
until a verdict is reached, length of time may be relevant as evidence of 
the verdict being unsafe and unsatisfactory.70 
6 '  An example of such an exceptional case is Dempsrer (1980) 71 Cr. App.R. 302. 
uZamparurri, supra. 
63 See, e.g. Ford [I9781 2 NZLR 258; Rafique [I9731 Crim LR 777. 
64 See Papadopoulos [I9791 1 NZLR 621, and George, supra. 
b5 Parrerson [I9801 2 NZLR 97, Gibson (1983) 77 Cr. App.R. 151 
66 Townsend [I9821 1 All ER 509 where a majority verdict for acquittal was not accepted 
and unanimity on a guilty verdict was reached after further consideration. 
" Katavich [I9781 1 NZLR 63. 
" Crimes Act 1961, s.374(2). 
69 See e.g. Papadopoulos, supra, Carsrairs & Sneller (unreported CA 176183 and 178183, 
decn.19.8.84); E.J. Smith [I9811 7 A.Crim.R.253. 
70 This seems implicit in the approach of the Court of Appeal in Carsrairs & Sneller, supra. 
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However, if rather than allowing continuance of the jury's deliberations, 
the judge places pressure on them to reach a verdict within a certain time, 
the verdict is highly likely to be vitiated. In George" the Court of Appeal 
reaffirmed the importance of the rule relating to time limits.72 The jury 
must not be hurried, but may, in the judge's discretion, be reminded that 
he may discharge them if they cannot reach agreement. This must be done 
in open court, though it appears that enquiries as to whether progress 
is being made can be forwarded by the judge through the Registrar without 
counsel being consulted in appropriate cases. There does not appear to 
be any requirement that counsel be consulted as to the desirability of 
prolonging deliberations, though it appears that this is a common practice.73 
There are two areas of difficulty here. The first is as to the point at 
which a jury's function is concluded and no further steps to resolve any 
ambiguities or inconsistencies latent in the verdict can be taken. The second 
concerns the verification of its unanimity. 
This article does not consider the law relating to inconsistent or ambiguous 
verdicts.74 Where a verdict is given which is or may be inconsistent or 
ambiguous, the judge may make inquiry of the jury as to the true meaning 
of their verdict or give appropriate directions to  them as to the issues involved 
and send the jury back to deliberate further75, even though the verdict 
might be interpreted as one of not guilty.76 It is not completely clear whether 
the judge can insist on a verdict which is unambiguous. One writer states 
the judge may insist on a simple not guilty or a guilty verdict77 but in 
Sorby the Court of Appeal appeared to recognise a right of the jury to 
insist on the original form of their verdict.78 It is also not clear whether, 
if this latter right exists, the jury must be reminded of it. It is submitted 
that any power to insist on a clear verdict of guilty or not guilty is restricted 
to cases where the verdict as first given would be interpreted as one of 
guilty. If the verdict is one which is truly ambiguous and thus indicates 
that there is a possibility of at least some jurors being in favour of acquittal, 
the judge may seek clarification of the verdict but should remind the jury 
that they have a right to insist on the form of their agreement. If there 
is real disagreement among members of the jury this will be likely to surface 
on further deliberation and the judge can then deal with matters in the 
normal way. There appears to  be no authority directly in point authorising 
this procedure, but it is submitted that the trend of the authorities is to 
7' CA 249183; decn. 21.4.84. 
7 2  As to which also see Rose [I9821 2 All ER 536; 75 Cr.App.R 322 and Mckenna [I9601 
1 QB 411. 
73 This is drawn from the dicta in George which will be of considerable importance in any 
jury trial cases in New Zealand. 
74  AS to which see Adams, Criminal Law and Practice in New Zealand paras.3107-3112, 
Perrott (unrep. CA 120182, 22.4.83) and Pomeroy (unrep. CA 84/83, 19.8.83). 
l5 Sorby [I9761 2 NZLR 516. 
l6 Ford [I9781 2 NZLR 258. 
77 Garrow and Caldwell, op.cit., p. 354, citing as authority HiN [I9541 NZLR 117 and Moore 
(1931) 23 Cr. App.R 138. These cases do not appear to establish the proposition for which 
they are cited. 
78 [I9761 2 NZLR 516 at 519. 
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ensure that no chance of an acquittal which might fairly have been open 
to the accused should be precluded by the intervention of the judges. 
However, once the verdict of the jury is given and accepted by the judge 
(correction of mere verbal slips apart)79, the jury is functus officio, the 
verdict as taken by the judge must therefore stand and no further steps 
can be taken to clarify the verdict.80 If the verdict taken is ambiguous 
and a chance of acquittal is lost because no steps to  clarify the verdict 
were taken. a new trial should not be orderedsl. but it is unclear what 
the position would be should the jury insist, despite requests for clarification, 
on a verdict which is unsatisfactory. It is suggested, in the absence of 
authority, that the verdict taken must be set aside and a new trial ordered. 
A final matter which is concerned with the taking of the verdict is 
ascertainment that the verdict is truly unanimous. The Court of Appeal 
has accepted that in exceptional cases a jury poll may be ordereds2 but 
has not given clear guidelines as to when the discretion to allow a poll 
should be exercised. In effect it appears that only if a juror indicates lack 
of agreement by replying in the negative to  the standard question of 
unanimity or there is something in the demeanour of a juror showing a 
possible lack of agreement should a poll be considered. No guidelines are 
suggested as to  the procedure following the decision to  take a poll. It is 
submitted that considerable assistance can be derived from the Canadian 
authorities as jury polling is not uncommon in that country. It appears 
that the Canadian cases have laid down as the test for whether a poll 
should be granted no more precise test than that formulated in New Zealand 
- it is one of the judge 'assuring himself that there is no misapprehension' 
as to unanimity.83 Once a poll has been requested, each juror must be 
asked for his verdict and the answer duly recorded. Should there be a 
clear lack of agreement, the jury may be instructed to retire for further 
deliberations and then the verdict be taken. The judge may give fresh 
directions on the relevant law, but is not obliged to do  so.84 Once the 
poll is taken and all jurors have indicated agreement, that verdict should 
stand and the jury cannot be requested to reconsider the issues.85 
As this article has attempted to illustrate there are some areas of the 
law relating to jury verdicts which remain surprisingly unclear in New 
79 Bateson [I9691 3 All E R  1372 
80 Sorby, supra. 
Ford, supra. 
X 2  Papadop~ulos (No.2) [ I  9791 1 NZLR 629. 
" Ford (1853) 3 UCCP 209, 218, recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Laforel (1980) 50 CCC (2d) I .  There is no 'right' in either Crown or defence to a poll 
- Recalla [I9351 4 DLR 353.64 CCC 276; OR 479. 
84 Lafbrer supra. Estey and Dickson JJ dissented in part, holding that in cases such as that 
one, where the verdict in question was as to an included offence and the poll indicated 
a possible misunderstanding of the law by a juror, further directions on the law should 
be given. 
85 Thomas (1983) 5 CCC (3d) 464 - an unusual case in that the jury, on a poll, returned 
a guilty verdict and were then sent back to reconsider their decision and returned with 
a verdict of acquittal. The Quebec Court of Appeal held that the first verdict given was 
the true verdict but in the circumstances ordered a retrial. 
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Zealand. The deficiencies in the Juries Act 1981 may be remediable by 
reference to  other areas of law, but it is clear that a reform of the law 
relating to jury selection would not be amiss. There may also be a need 
for further provision to deal more specifically with other matters relating 
to the jury, especially in regard to cases where information prejudicial to 
the accused has come into the hands of a juror. In cases such as this, 
where there is no uniformity among the Commonwealth courts, legislative 
intervention may be needed. There may be some areas where problems 
not resolvable by reference to legislation may be dealt with by reference 
to the practices of overseas courts, but in other areas, as the discussion 
in relation to s.376 of the Crimes Act indicates, there may be difficulties 
in ascertaining what the true position is or ought to be. A review of the 
law in this area would not be unjustified or premature. 
